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Michigan Supreme Court
Hamed v. Wayne County et al, 490 Mich 1; 830 NW2d 237 (2011). Mr. Tucker represented Wayne County and the Wayne County Sheriff in a lawsuit filed by a detainee in the Wayne County Jail who alleged quid pro quo claim sexual harassment after she was sexually assaulted by a correctional officer employed in the jail. The trial court ruled in favor of the county defendants and plaintiff appeal. Wayne County asked Mr. Tucker to respond to the appeal. In July of 2009, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision ruling that under Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act an employer could be held strictly liable for the unforeseeable, criminal acts of its employee. The Court relied on a 1996 Michigan Supreme Court decision, Champion v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 450 Mich 702; 545 NW2d 220 (2006), which held that employers could be held strictly liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment claims arising out of such circumstances. Mr. Tucker filed an Application for Leave to Appeal in the Supreme Court, which was granted in June of 2010. Mr. Tucker's initial position in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court was that over 150 years of common-law jurisprudence in Michigan provided that employers could not be held liable for the intentional, tortious conduct committed by employees acting outside the scope of their employment. The Michigan Constitution preserves the common law until and unless it is explicitly abrogated by statute or a subsequent judicial ruling. Mich. Const. Art. 3, § 7. Nothing in the Civil Rights Act explicitly abrogated this common-law rule. As a result, Mr. Tucker argued that Wayne County and the Wayne County Sheriff could not be liable to the plaintiff for the unforeseeable, intentional acts of the jail officer. After Mr. Tucker presented oral argument on his appeal, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed the Court of Appeals decision. The Court reaffirmed the common-law rule, reasoned that nothing in the Civil Rights Act had abrogated this rule, and ruled that the trial court had correctly entered judgment in the county's favor. The Court explicitly overruled the Champion decision, holding that claimants could not circumvent the common-law rule by artfully pleading sexual harassment claims under the Civil Rights Act when what they were truly attempting to plead was respondeat superior liability against businesses and employers for the unforeseeable, intentional acts of employees, which were outside the scope of employment. In addition to saving millions of dollars in liability for Wayne County, this case will have a positive future impact for private and public employers throughout the state of Michigan by significantly reducing litigation costs and enabling employers to better assess potential risks and liabilities.
Odom v Wayne County et al, 482 Mich 459; 760 NW2d 217 (2008). Mr. Tucker represented a deputy sheriff and Wayne County in a suit by an individual claiming malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. The client received an unfavorable verdict in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court's denial of the deputy's claim of governmental immunity. With only two weeks to do so, Mr. Tucker filed an application and brief in support for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. The Court initially denied the application, with three justices agreeing that the Court should hear the case. Realizing the import of the issues and the close vote at the application stage, Mr. Tucker filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court granted, a rare event. The Court asked the parties to address the issue of individual immunity from intentional torts for all governmental employees in the state of Michigan, an issue that had been in disarray for over 20 years. After Mr. Tucker fully briefed the issues and presented oral argument on the case, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals, agreeing with Mr. Tucker that the wrong legal standards had been applied by the Court of Appeals. The Court enunciated the proper standard to be applied when lower courts address liability issues of individual governmental employees accused of intentional torts. This case has had major jurisprudential significance on governmental entities and their individual employees, and the cost of future litigation has been significantly reduced as a result of this opinion.
Michigan Department of Transportation v Employers Mutual Casualty Co et al, 481 Mich 862; 748 NW2d 239 (2008). After a catastrophic accident involving a motor carrier hauling gasoline caused significant property damage to a state highway system, the state of Michigan brought claims against an insurance company and the owner of the truck seeking over $3 million in property damages. The issue, one of first impression, was whether a federally mandated coverage endorsement required for transporters of hazardous substances allowed for the state of Michigan to sue the insurance company and the trucking company for damages above the statutorily capped $1 million available for property damage claims under Michigan's No-Fault Automobile Insurance law. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, ruled against the insurance company and the trucking company holding that the federal endorsement created a private right of action and implicitly amended Michigan's No-Fault law, which allowed the state of Michigan to sue the insurance company and the trucking company to recover damages above the statutorily capped $1 million. After the Supreme Court granted oral argument on an application for leave to appeal, Mr. Tucker was asked to brief the issues and present the oral argument on the application. On May 7, 2008, Mr. Tucker presented oral arguments to the Court and on May 16, 2008, the Court issued a peremptory order reversing the Court of Appeals in favor of the insurance company and the trucking company.
Michigan Court of Appeals
Gentry v Carmona, Unpublished Opinion of the Michigan Court of Appeals, dated October 11, 2011 (Docket No. 296580), Mr. Tucker defended a Wayne County Deputy Sheriff against claims of unreasonable use of "deadly force" and "excessive force" arising from Deputy Carmona's act of shooting plaintiff, who fought with four deputies trying to arrest him. The trial court denied Deputy Carmona's motion for summary disposition. Applying the standard established by Odom v. Wayne County (the Supreme Court decision that Mr. Tucker briefed and argued), Mr. Tucker asserted that Deputy Carmona acted in "good faith" when he exercised his discretion to shoot plaintiff after Deputy Carmona's partner shouted that plaintiff had wrested control over his firearm. The Court of Appeals panel (Murphy, Talbot and Fitzgerald) agreed and reversed the trial court's decision. The Court pointed out that the "good faith" standard developed and clarified in Odom was "subjective" in nature and designed to protect a law enforcement officer's "honest belief and good-faith conduct with the cloak of immunity". The Court concluded that the record demonstrated that events faced by Deputy Carmona were rapidly transpiring and his split-second decision to draw his weapon and fire, weighing the potential risks of discharging his firearm against the possibility of harm to his partner, the other officers and himself if plaintiff gained control of the weapon was performed in good faith and he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Nuculovic v Johnny Dean Hill and SMART Bus Inc, 287 Mich App 58; 783 NW2d 124 (2010). Representing defendant, the Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transport (SMART) and its driver, Mr. Tucker prepared a brief in an appeal from a lower court judgment in SMART's favor finding that the plaintiff had failed to provide written notice of a claim to SMART within the 60-days required by statutory law for tort claims filed against transportation authorities. In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing with Mr. Tucker's arguments that in order for a claimant to successfully survive summary disposition in a suit for tort claims against SMART the claimant must service written notice of the particular claim upon SMART within the 60-day notice period. The Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff's failure to demonstrate that she had served written notice of her claim upon SMART precluded her right to bring suit for damages arising out of the alleged incident.
Wayne County Sheriff v Wayne County Executive Officer, Michigan Court of Appeals (Docket No. 290135). Mr. Tucker represented the Wayne County Sheriff in defending an appeal from a mandamus order issued by the Wayne County Circuit Court forcing the Wayne County CEO to continue funding constitutionally and statutorily required functions of the constitutional office of the Wayne County Sheriff. Mr. Tucker briefed issues concerning the import and status of the common-law and constitutional duties and powers of county sheriffs in Michigan and the legal impossibility of other branches of government to interfere with the sheriff's role as a constitutional officer, elected by the people to enforce the law and protect the public. Mr. Tucker garnered the support of the National Sheriff's Association, which filed a brief amicus curiae in support of the Wayne County Sheriff and the trial court's decision upholding the sheriff's authority. The appeal was dismissed by stipulation of the parties after oral argument.
McCarthy v Amy Allen, Oakland County Care House, et al. , Unpublished Order of the Michigan Court of Appeals, October 14, 2008 (Docket No. 284129). In defending an appeal from a trial court's decision granting summary disposition in a case filed against a social welfare organization and its employee alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process, false imprisonment, defamation, gross negligence, bad faith, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, obstruction of justice, libel, slander and fraud, Mr. Tucker secured summary affirmance for the defendants. This is a rare occurrence which requires unanimity in the Court of Appeals panel deciding such a motion. As a result, Mr. Tucker saved the client considerable expenses defending a lawsuit that continued for years against other defendants that Mr. Tucker did not represent.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Molnar v Amy Allen, Oakland County Care House, et al, 359 Fed. Appx. 623 (6th Cir. 2009). In defending a suit against a social welfare organization and its employee alleging federal civil rights causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985, Mr. Tucker briefed and argued before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals defending an appeal from a decision of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granting the social welfare organization's motion for summary judgment. The Court affirmed the district court's decision in favor of the social welfare organization, agreeing with Mr. Tucker that the plaintiff had failed to provide documentary evidence sufficient to withstand summary judgment and had improperly attempted to expand the record for appellate review.
U.S. Supreme Court
Molnar v Amy Allen, Oakland County Care House, et al., Case No. 09-1536 (2009). After successfully defending an appeal to the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, Mr. Tucker prepared an opposition brief to a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that the Sixth Circuit had correctly ruled in his clients' favor and the issues raised by petitioner did not warrant review. The Supreme Court agreed with Mr. Tucker, denying the petition and effectively affirmed the result secured by Mr. Tucker in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
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Vermont Law School, J.D. with honors 2000
Environmental Editor, Vermont Law Review
Vermont Law School, Master of Studies in Environmental Law, 1997
University of Georgia, B.A. 1994
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